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Trusts. Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345 (R.I. 1997). The illusory-
transfer test is the proper test to determine if an inter-vivos trans-
fer of real property to a trust is sufficient to defeat a surviving
spouse's entitlement of a life estate in the real property created
under section 33-25-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
Pursuant to section 33-25-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
a surviving spouse is entitled to a life estate in real property that
was owned solely by the deceased spouse at the time of his or her
death.1 In Pezza v. Pezza,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted the illusory-transfer test to determine whether an inter-
vivos transfer of real property in a trust can defeat the surviving
spouse's statutory right to a life estate in such real property.3
Under the illusory-transfer test, the court looks at the substance of
the inter-vivos transfer and determines whether the deceased
spouse had, in good faith, divested himself or herself of ownership
of the property.4 In Pezza, the court held that a trust, which is
irrevocable at the time of the transferor's death and divests the
decedent of all benefits of trust property ownership, is complete,
real and not illusory; therefore, it is not subject to the statutory
interest of the surviving spouse created under section 33-25-2.5
FACTS AND CASE TRAVEL
Anthony (Anthony) and Olga (Olga) Pezza married in 1973.6
They jointly owned a residence in Florida and several bank ac-
counts. On December 29, 1983, Anthony created a revocable inter-
vivos trust.7 He transferred into the trust four parcels of real es-
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2 (1956) (1995 Reenactment). The statute states in
part:
Whenever any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving, the
real estate owned by the decedent in fee simple at his or her death shall
descend and pass to the husband or wife for his or her natural life subject,
however, to any encumbrances existing at death; provided that the liabil-
ity, if any, of the decedent to discharge the encumbrance or encumbrances
shall not be impaired.
Id.
2. 690 A.2d 345 (R.I. 1997).
3. See id. at 350.
4. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. 1937).
5. Pezza, 690 A.2d at 350.
6. See id. at 345.
7. See id.
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tate he acquired prior to his marriage to Olga, along with shares of
stock in his garage door business.8 He named himself a trustee.9
Anthony's intent in creating the trust was to ensure that children
from his previous marriage would attain ownership of the property
upon his death.10 After this conveyance, Anthony still occupied
one of the parcels of real estate, collected rents from the other
three parcels and retained the power to revoke the trust and the
power to demand payment of the trust principal.1' Anthony's will
was executed simultaneously with the trust and contained a "pour-
over" provision providing that any remaining assets of the estate
became part of the trust upon his death.12
On June 25, 1986, when Anthony and Olga were experiencing
marital difficulties, Anthony resigned as trustee, appointed his
son, Michael, his successor and waived his right to revoke the
trust.13 Olga commenced divorce proceedings on November 14,
1986. On December 5, 1986, Anthony disclaimed his power to de-
mand the trust principal effective June 25, 1986. Anthony died on
August 18, 1990 with a valid will and his marriage to Olga still
intact. 14
Olga filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief in the Rhode
Island Superior Court on January 17, 1991. She contended that
the transfer of the real property was a fraudulent attempt to defeat
her statutory right to a life estate in the real property under sec-
tion 33-25-2.15 She asked the court to declare the trust invalid and
give her a life estate in the real property deeded to the trust.16 The
trial court considered the tests used by courts in other jurisdic-
tions. The court concluded that, of the two tests most utilized, the
fraudulent-transfer test' 7 and the illusory-transfer test,' 8 the lat-
8. See id.
9. See id.








17. See, e.g., Stoxen v. Stoxen, 285 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Mushaw v.
Mushaw, 39 A.2d 465 (Md. 1944); Riggio v. Southwest Bank of St. Louis, 815
S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246 (N.H. 1983); Sherrill
v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
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ter that was the fairest method of analysis. 19 The trial court held a
transfer of property with intent to defeat a surviving spouse's stat-
utory share alone was insufficient to invalidate an irrevocable
trust. This is because intent is not relevant when a transfer is ana-
lyzed using the illusory-transfer test.20 The court found that at the
time of Anthony's death, the trust was real, valid and not illusory
because Anthony had resigned as trustee and made the trust irrev-
ocable. 21 Therefore, the trust property is not subject to the statu-
tory life estate of the surviving spouse. 22 Olga appealed to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND
Because the issue was one of first impression for the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, it looked to other jurisdictions for gui-
dance. 23 Primarily, two tests are used when examining whether
an inter-vivos transfer can defeat a surviving spouse's statutory
interest in property.24 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
adopted the fraudulent-intent test. This test looks to the transfer
and asks whether the transfer was made with the intent to deprive
the surviving spouse of his or her statutory share. 25 If the court
finds that there was an intent to defeat the statute based on the
court's evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the transfer,
then the court will invalidate the transfer and the property will be
available for distribution to the surviving spouse.26 This test has
been criticized because it casts doubt on the validity of all inter-
vivos transfers of property when a spouse retains sole ownership if
the transfer was made without the other spouse's knowledge.27
18. See, e.g., Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 1981); (N.Y. 1937); Newman v.
Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966; Moore v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Seifert v.
Southern Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 409 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 1991).
19. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 348.
20. See id. at 348. The intent to defeat the surviving spouse's statutory share
is relevant in the fraudulent-transfer test. Analysis under the fraudulent-transfer
test would invalidate an inter-vivos trust that was specifically created to defeat a
spouse's statutory share. See id.; see also Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246 (N.H.
1983).
21. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 350.
22. See id. at 347-48.
23. See id. at 348; see also supra notes 17-18.
24. See id.
25. See Hanke, 459 A.2d at 248.
26. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 348.
27. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (N.Y. 1937).
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The illusory-transfer test, by contrast, was adopted by the
New York Court of Appeals in Newman v. Dore.28 The illusory-
transfer test focuses on the substance of the transfer rather than
the intent of the transferor to defeat a statutory survival statute.29
In Newman, the court held that the only relevant inquiry is
whether the transferor-spouse had "in good faith" divested owner-
ship of the property to the transferee.30 Intent is relevant only to
the question of whether the transferor intended to fully divest
ownership of the property to a third party, rather than to defraud
the surviving spouse of a statutory share of the property.3 1 Under
the illusory-transfer test, a transferor has the right to transfer
ownership of property as he sees fit as long as the transaction sub-
stantively accomplishes its intended purpose. A transaction that
purports to transfer ownership but in reality allows the transferor
to retain substantial ownership rights is said to be illusory. In
Staples v. King,32 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that it
would be irrational to allow a deceased spouse to defeat the surviv-
ing spouse's statutory share by executing trusts to deplete his es-
tate while reserving the benefits of ownership in the trust
property.33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered the two preva-
lent tests, the fraudulent-intent test and the illusory-transfer test,
used to evaluate inter-vivos transfers of property by a deceased
spouse. 34 The court concluded that the illusory-transfer test should
be used to determine whether an inter-vivos transfer of real prop-
erty will defeat a surviving spouse's statutory share created by sec-
tion 33-25-2. 35 The court found that the illusory-transfer test
balances the policy interest of protecting the continuation of the
surviving spouse's interest in the real property with the policy in-
28. See id.; see also Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 1981).
29. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 348.
30. See Newman, 9. N.E.2d at 969.
31. See id. The requirement of "good faith" in this context "does not refer to
the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent to divest himself of the ownership of
the property." Id.
32. 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 1981).
33. See id. at 411.
34. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 348-49.
35. See id. at 350.
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terest of allowing an owner of real property to freely divest himself
of ownership.36 According to the court, the illusory-transfer test
mandates that a conveyance of real property made by a spouse to a
trust or other third party be "real, complete and not illusory."37
When an inter-vivos transfer is made to a trust, the surviving
spouse must prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that the de-
ceased spouse did not finally and completely transfer all ownership
interest and control over the trust property.38
The court applied the illusory-transfer test to the facts of this
case and determined that Anthony's transfer of real property to the
trust was real and complete when it became irrevocable on Decem-
ber 5, 1986.39 The court noted that when Anthony first established
the trust in 1983, he may not have had the present donative intent
to totally divest himself of the real property. But at the time of his
death, the trust was not illusory because he named his son succes-
sor trustee, and divested himself of the right to revoke the trust
and the right to demand payment of the trust principal. 40 Conse-
quently, the real property is not subject to a life estate in favor of
Olga.41
CONCLUSION
In Pezza, the Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that
section 33-25-2 is a reflection of the policy considerations concern-
ing protection of a surviving spouse's interests in real property
owned exclusively by the deceased spouse at the time of death. In
adopting the illusory-transfer test to determine if an inter-vivos
transfer of real property will defeat a claim under section 33-25-2,
the court took the position that a spouse with complete ownership
of real property may transfer that ownership if the transfer is com-
plete, real and not illusory at the time of the transferor's death.
Therefore, the transaction is judged by its substance, not its form.
36. See id. The court was careful to note that the interest created under sec-
tion 33-25-2 is only an expectancy interest that vests when one spouse dies while
owning real property in fee simple. Therefore, a spouse owning real property in fee
simple can transfer his whole interest, in fee simple, to another without interfering
in the surviving spouse's interest under section 33-25-2. See id. at 349.
37. Id. at 350.
38. See Slepkow v. Robinson, 324 A.2d 321, 325 (R.I. 1974).
39. See Pezza, 690 A.2d at 350.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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Because the intent requirement is irrelevant, the illusory-transfer
test evades the argument of a surviving spouse that a presumption
of fraud arises whenever the deceased spouse has transferred a
part of his estate during his lifetime without the surviving spouse's
knowledge.
Karen M. Hagan
